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Assessing Moral Claims in International 








The paper explains the importance of narrowing the gap between developed 
and developing countries’ perceptions of justice in the climate change 
context and analyzes the two main ethical claims raised by the developing 
countries, exposing their major weaknesses and strengths. It then offers the 
adoption of harmonized carbon taxes and the rejection of Kyoto’s cap-and-
trade mitigation scheme, as a way to avoid inevitably unresolved ethical 
issues. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end 
of 2012, and all international efforts taken so far to agree on a new 
international framework have failed.
1
 At the heart of the deadlock lies the 
conflict between developed and developing countries,
2
 with the United 
States and the large developing countries being the key (non)players.
3
 The 
conflict surrounds the just allocation of costs.
4
 Developing countries want 
the developed countries to bear most, if not all, of the costs of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) mitigation and to help them finance adaptation to the inevitable 
climate change that is already taking place and that will get much worse 
even under optimistic predictions.
5
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., ANDREW DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE xv (2d ed. 2010) (“While the Kyoto 
Protocol represents a modest first step toward a concrete response to climate change, there 
has been essentially no progress in negotiating the larger, longer-term changes that will be 
required to slow, stop, or reverse any human-induced climate changes that are occurring.”). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 188 (“[N]egotiations of mutual mitigation effort must also address 
the conflict between industrialized and developing countries at the heart of the current 
deadlock.”); GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY & KRISTEN A. SHEERAN, SAVING KYOTO 124 (2009) 
(“[T]he conflict between the rich and the poor nations is the cause of Kyoto’s uncertain 
future.”). 
 3. See NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET 13 (2009) [hereinafter 
STERN, BLUEPRINT] (noting that the world’s six highest emitters are China, the United States, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, and India, accounting together for the majority of global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE 
JUSTICE 30 (2010) (“Without deep cuts by these countries from current levels, it is 
impossible to achieve reasonable stabilization goals.”) (emphasis in original). With the 
exception of Russia, none of these countries has agreed to commit itself to limitations on 
GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol—and even Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol only 
because its assigned target was to hold emissions to their 1990 level, which meant it was 
provided with excessive emission permits it could sell to the other countries, as Russia’s 
emissions were significantly below 1990 level at the time it joined the treaty. See also 
DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 25 (“Russia, for example, met the target because of the 
collapse of the Soviet economy after 1990.”). 
 4. See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE 
POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 1 (2003) (discussing developing countries’ opposition to emissions 
limitations and their assertion that wealthy countries “have emitted much greater amounts of 
greenhouse gases in the course of industrialization and . . . currently maintain far more 
greenhouse gas-intensive lifestyles”); Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/globalwarming/index.html (“At the heart 
of the international debate is a momentous tussle between rich and poor countries over who 
steps up first and who pays most for changed energy menus.”).  
 5. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 4, at 42 (observing that the majority of 
developing countries have “strong equity arguments” against voluntarily submitting to 
growth restrictive emissions obligations). 
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Considerations of justice are always important in negotiations. 
According to Albin’s seminal study, negotiators “use principles of justice 
and fairness as instruments to reach agreements and to regulate their 
interaction, in light of opposing claims and interests.”
6
 Relying on these 
principles “promotes consensus and successful outcomes.”
7
 Moreover, 
negotiators believe that agreements that are achieved on the basis of justice 
and fairness principles are more likely to be broadly supported and 
enforced.
8
 Disagreements over issues of justice “all too often undermine the 




In the context of climate change, accounting for justice is especially 
crucial, as evidenced by the numerous international meetings that failed to 
make any progress on the way to a global mitigation scheme.
10
 It is not 
enough for a climate change treaty to make each and every developing 
country better off under an objective cost-benefit analysis for developing 
countries to agree to accept it.
11
 The treaty has to be perceived as fair.
12
 
The classic example of such a possibility is known as the “Ultimatum 
Game.”
13
 Two players who do not know each other have to decide how to 
divide a sum of money between them.
14
 The first player proposes how to 
divide the sum,
15
 and the second player can either accept or reject the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See CECILIA ALBIN, JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 219 
(2001) (conducting case studies of the negotiations to combat acid rain, to manage 
international trade, to lay the foundations for a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the Oslo 
Accords and after, and to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).   
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 218 (discussing the motivations that drive negotiating parties to act 
reasonably).  
 9. Id. at 1; see also LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 18–21 
(1994) (making a similar argument in the context of the North–South divide on who should 
pay for climate change mitigation); CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF 
RETURN: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS (forthcoming) (relying on 
Rawls’s theory of justice in claiming that arguments that are perceived to be just and fair 
may influence the regimes of the negotiating countries in ways that facilitate agreement that 
would not have been reached on the basis of pure self-serving arguments).    
 10. See ALBIN, supra note 6, at 54–99 (providing examples of international meetings 
regarding the battle against acid rain that have failed to make progress in terms of global 
mitigation).  
 11. See id. at 98 (specifying “the financial cost of implementation and its perceived 
fairness” as among the factors influencing “whether countries choose to adhere to an 
environmental agreement”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See KEN BINMORE, PLAYING FOR REAL 545 (2007) (describing in detail the 
Ultimatum Game as an exception to traditional game theory). 
 14. See id. at 502–03 (explaining the rules of the Ultimatum Game). 
 15. Id. 
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proposal.
16
 If the second player rejects it, neither player receives anything.
17
 
If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal.
18
 
The game is played only once so reciprocation is not an issue.
19
 Offers of 
less than thirty percent of the sum “are refused more than half the time, 
even though the responder then gets nothing at all.”
20
 In games played in 
poor countries, offers were rejected even when “the dollar payoffs [were] a 
substantial fraction of the subjects’ annual income.”
21
 The prominent 
explanation for such a result is that people are willing to incur significant 
costs to punish people who they think treated them unfairly.
22
 
One might question whether experiments with individuals indicate 
anything about government behavior in similar situations.
23
 The truth is that 
we do not know, because we cannot run such experiments with real 
governments, but these experiments form our best prediction tool.
24
  
Being aware of the importance of justice (equity) considerations, 
principles of justice and fairness were explicitly stated in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 (UNFCCC).
25
 
It is the foundational legal document of global climate change negotiations, 
and 195 parties have already signed and ratified it, including the United 
States.
26
 The convention’s first principle states that “[t]he Parties should 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 546 (explaining that the motivating forces in “a repeated game can be 
totally different from those of the one-shot game”). 
 20. Id. at 545. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 546 (“In the Ultimatum Game, we have to learn the difficult lesson that 
there is no point in shooting yourself in the foot because you are angry at receiving an unfair 
offer from someone you are never going to meet again.”). 
 23. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT 60 (2003) (assessing the 
results of game-theory experimentation as compared to state behavior in “games of 
transnational externalities”). 
 24. Id.; see also Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 
WORLD POLITICS 25, 25 (1985) (“The application of game theory to international politics is 
hardly new, but there has been a recent increase in the popularity of the approach.”); Ethan 
Kapstein, Fairness Considerations in World Politics: Lessons from International Trade 
Negotiations, 123 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 229, 234 (2008) (discussing the 
Ultimatum Game in the context of international relations theory and finding that “the 
adoption of fairness considerations may be crucial to the achievement of cooperative 
outcomes in many settings, and that such outcomes can be achieved even in the absence of 
iterated negotiations”). 
 25. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, adopted 
May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter 
UNFCCC] (listing the basic principles underlying the provisions of the Convention). 
 26. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 
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protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations 
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”
27
 
Unfortunately, developed and developing countries disagree on the 
principle’s interpretation, leading to the current deadlock.
28
 Delaying global 
action is not in the interest of either party.
29
 Developing countries will be 
the first to suffer from climate change,
30
 but developed countries will start 
incurring huge costs due to climate change merely a decade or so later.
31
 In 
addition, according to climate scientists, the main problem is that there are 
“critical thresholds or tipping points in the climate system.”
32
 When the 
system reaches a tipping point, such as the “collapse of the polar ice sheets 
or a change in ocean circulation,”
33
 catastrophes will be unavoidable.
34
 At a 
certain unknown GHG concentration, our ability to stop the transformation 
of Earth into the equivalent of Venus
35
 will depend on risky geo-
engineering (e.g., injecting reflective aerosols or sulfur into the 
                                                                                                                 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2011) (providing detailed information on the current signatories to the 
UNFCCC) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 27. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3.1 (emphasis added). For a full discussion of the 
UNFCCC’s equity principles, see infra Part I. 
 28. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. EUR. 
COM. INT’L ENVT’L L. 120, 124 (2000) (“Most industrial countries opposed the inclusion of 
Article 3 in the [UNFCCC] as it could potentially introduce a note of uncertainty into the 
context of the [UNFCCC] obligations.”). 
 29. See STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 14 (“Delay now and haste later not only 
build up damage but also risk expensive mistakes in investment decisions. The greater the 
coordinated involvement of all emitters, the more successful, cheaper and equitable are the 
actions and outcomes.”).   
 30. See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 21–22 (“[T]he regions of the world 
where the effects of emissions will be the worst also happen to be poor . . . . In addition, 
poor countries tend to be more dependent on agriculture . . . . Finally, poor countries cannot 
adapt as easily as rich countries, simply because of lack of resources.”).  
 31. Id. at 26.  
 32. CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 11.  
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. (“Once we pass these thresholds, there is no turning back and the 
consequences could be dire.”). 
 35. See JAMES HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN 224–26 (2009) (summarizing 
changes in Venus’s atmospheric composition over time and indicating that the “Venus 
Syndrome” is a major threat of rising GHG emissions). In the past, Venus was a wet planet, 
but then it experienced “a ‘runaway’ greenhouse gas effect.” Id. at 225. Venus’s atmosphere 
now is almost 97 percent carbon dioxide and its surface temperature is 450° Celsius (roughly 
850° Fahrenheit). Id.  
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stratosphere).
36
 The risk that such disastrous scenarios will take place is 
shared by everyone on the planet,
37
 and as there is uncertainty regarding the 
exact GHG concentration that will start the runaway GHG effect,
38
 all 




Moreover, reducing GHG concentrations gradually is much less costly 
than attempting to do so over a short period of time.
40
 “[C]ost is linked to 
the pace of change.”
41
 Time enables us to phase out polluting plants instead 
of having to write-off relatively recent investments.
42
 It also takes time for 
investments in climate-safe energy technologies to come to fruition.
43
  
All of the above make it imperative to bridge the divide between the 
rich and poor countries and reach international cooperation on GHG 
mitigation.
44
 This paper analyzes the two principal justice-based arguments 
raised by developing countries, exposing their major weaknesses and 
strengths in an effort to narrow the gap between developed and developing 
countries’ perceptions of justice in the climate change context. Once the 
gap in perceptions of justice is narrowed, global abatement schemes must 
be found that will avoid unresolved ethical issues, thereby increasing the 
feasibility of their adoption by all parties. A Kyoto-style cap-and-trade 
scheme requires allocation of emissions rights across countries
45
 and thus 
requires raising right at the beginning of the negotiations the highly 
ethically-loaded question of whether equal per-capita allocation should be 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See id. at 224–31 (discussing the nature of risky geo-engineering models in light of 
Venus’s change in atmospheric compositions over time). 
 37. See CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining that reaching a 
tipping point in Earth’s climate system “would cause abrupt and catastrophic changes that no 
living or economic system could quickly adapt to”). 
 38. See HANSEN, supra note 35, at 226 (noting that the question is not whether Earth 
could experience a runaway greenhouse effect, but “rather, how much must carbon dioxide 
(or some other climate forcing) increase before a runaway effect occurs”).  
 39. See CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 38 (“We should think of climate 
policy as an insurance policy against potentially catastrophic events.”). 
 40. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
xvi (2007) [hereinafter STERN, ECONOMICS] (“Ultimately stabilisation—at whatever level—
requires that annual emissions be brought down to more than 80% below current levels. This 
is a major challenge, but sustained long-term action can achieve it at costs that are low in 
comparison to the risks of inaction.”).  
 41. STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 156.   
 42. See id. (concluding that interim reduction targets are necessary as “[i]t would be 
very costly to try to achieve most of the cuts in the last ten years of the [targeted] period”).   
 43. Id. 
 44. Supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
 45. See POSNER AND WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 119 (detailing the various possible 
emissions-allocation approaches to addressing global climate change). 




 Harmonized carbon taxes, with each country retaining its tax 
revenue, fare much better on that front.
47
 
Part II discusses the UNFCCC’s first principle.
48
 In Part III, I will 
briefly explain why the developing countries’ requests to be exempted from 
GHG mitigation must be rejected outright.
49
 Part IV discusses distributive 
justice,
50
 and Part V discusses corrective justice.
51




II. United Nations Framework Convention on  
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
 
In 1992, nearly all countries of the world, including the United States, 
joined an international treaty—the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
53
—to stabilize “greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”
54
  
The treaty sets no mandatory limits on GHG emissions for individual 
countries
55
 and contains no enforcement mechanisms.
56
 It merely provides 
the principles on which the countries agree to base their international 
agreement on climate change policy.
57
  
The first principle reads as follows:  
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See id. at 120 (“[T]he per capita approach remains the reigning political and 
ethical paradigm for the distribution of permits because it has been largely unquestioned.”). 
 47. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV. 
63, 63–87 (2010) (detailing an exposition of this argument, including application to negative 
emissions (e.g., reforestation)). 
 48. Infra Part II. 
 49. Infra Part III. 
 50. Infra Part IV. 
 51. Infra Part V. 
 52. Infra Part VI. 
 53. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, supra note 26. 
 54. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 2. 
 55. See generally id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id., art. 3 (providing principles by which the Parties should be guided in 
carrying out the provisions of the Convention). The treaty provides for updates (called 
“protocols”) that would set mandatory emission limits. Id., art. 17. The Kyoto Protocol, to 
which the United States is not a Party and which does not impose any limitations on 
developing countries, came into force in 2005 and will expire at the end of 2012. See 
generally Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 





The term “respective capabilities” means that rich countries should 
bear most of the cost of mitigation and are expected to provide developing 
countries with financial help to adapt to the climate change.
59




The term “differentiated responsibilities” is understood by developing 
countries to mean that developed countries bear greater responsibility due 
to their greater contribution to global environmental degradation.
61
 The 




Developing countries interpreted the UNFCCC as allowing their 
exemption from GHG mitigation based on the “differentiated 
responsibilities” justification—namely, the corrective justice claim
63
—and 
as entitling them to financial help on the basis of the “respective 
capabilities” justification.
64
 This interpretation of the UNFCCC as linking 
between mitigation commitments and historical emissions can find support 
in the differences between the commitments required of developed 
                                                                                                                 
 58. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3 (emphasis added). “The chapeau to [UNFCCC] 
Article 4 (commitments) also obliges parties to take into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities in fulfilling the commitments under the [UNFCCC.].” 
Rajamani, supra note 28, at 121. 
 59. See UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3 (“[T]he developed country Parties should take 
the lead in combatting climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 121 (“The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility . . . builds on the acknowledgement by industrial countries that they bear the 
primary responsibility for creating climate change by taking into account the historical 
(rather than future) contributions of States to climate change in determining their 
responsibility under the regime.”); STERN, ECONOMICS, supra note 40, at 42 (“The argument 
[that rich countries should transfer money to poor countries to help them finance adaptation] 
is strongly reinforced by the historical responsibility of rich countries for the bulk of 
accumulated stock of GHGs.”).   
 62. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1565, 1565–1612 (2008) (analyzing the argument made by developing countries that the 
United States owes remedial action or material compensation due to its past emissions as a 
corrective justice claim).  
 63. See id. at 1592 (“In the context of climate change, the corrective justice argument 
is that the United States wrongfully harmed the rest of the world—especially low-lying 
states and others that are most vulnerable to global warming—by emitting greenhouse gases 
in vast quantities.”). 
 64. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 130 (providing that cooperation requires wealthier 
countries to assist “countries particularly vulnerable to climate change to meet the costs of 
adaptation, financing and promoting technology transfer”). 
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countries and those required of economies in transition, such as Eastern 
European countries.
65
 Economies in transition had past emissions at a scale 
similar to that of developed countries, but were far poorer than developed 
countries.
66




Under the UNFCCC, “economies in transition, like industrial 
countries, are expected to stabilize their GHG emissions.”
68
 However, 
“unlike industrial countries they assume no financial obligations towards 
developing countries and can benefit from technological transfers.”
69
 
“Since countries with economies in transition have not been spared 
mitigation commitments, it can be inferred then that mitigation 




The United States, although party to the UNFCCC, opposes the above 
interpretation of the notion of differentiated responsibilities.
71
 When the 
Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (known 
as the Byrd–Hagel resolution)
72
 that rejected any commitment to limit U.S. 
GHG emissions “unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new 
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance 
period.”
73
 The Senate expressed its concern that “developing countries 
would have an unfair economic advantage if they did not face the same 
restrictions as the U.S.” and that “there would be an export of U.S. jobs and 
industry to developing nations.”
74
 The United States eventually signed the 
Kyoto Protocol but never ratified it.
75
 Two months after taking office in 
2001, the Bush administration announced it would not ratify the Kyoto 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See id., at 126 (“Since countries with economies in transition have not been spared 
mitigation commitments, it can be inferred then that mitigation commitments under the 
[UNFCCC] are directly linked to historical responsibility.”). 
 66. See id. (citing “economic constraints” and high past-emissions rates as 
characteristic of economies in transition). 
 67. See id. (listing the similarities shared by developing and transition economies).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.   
 71. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (providing an example of why the 
United States opposes the aforementioned interpretation of differentiated responsibilities). 
 72. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Rajamani, supra note 28, at 128. 
 75. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Sept. 19, 
2011) (providing information on current signatories to the Protocol) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
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Protocol because there was too much scientific uncertainty about climate 
change
76
 and because ratifying it would harm the U.S. economy as no limits 
were imposed on developing countries’ emissions.
77
  
The U.S. position has not changed in all the international climate 
change negotiations that took place since then.
78
 It is possible, however, 
that the justification for the United States’ requirement that developing 
countries would limit their emissions has evolved over the years.
79
 The 
United States’ fear of economic competition may have even strengthened, 
as China, India, and a few other developing countries have become leading 
players in the global economy.
80
 But it is now also much better understood 
that without universal coverage, a global mitigation scheme would be 
prohibitively costly, if not completely futile,
81
 due to the inability to take 
advantage of the least costly abatement opportunities, as well as leakage 




III. Universal Coverage is Necessary 
  
This paper discusses moral (equity) claims. There is no reason to think 
that such claims cannot be settled without maintaining the efficiency of 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL 
OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL 
WARMING 169–215 (2010) (offering a historian’s account of the misuse of science for 
political and commercial ends and arguing that climate skepticism is being used strategically 
by the fossil fuel industry and politicians influenced by that industry). 
 77. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 127 (stating the position of the United States to be 
“that it would take ‘meaningful participation from key developing countries’ for the U.S. to 
ratify the Protocol”). 
 78. See, e.g., Anup Shah, Reactions to Climate Change Negotiations and Action, 
GLOBALISSUES.ORG, http://www.globalissues.org/article/179/reactions-to-climate-change-
negotiations-and-action (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (providing background on U.S. 
participation, actions, and reactions regarding climate change negotiations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).   
 79. See id. (describing how developing countries joined climate change negotiations in 
the early 1990s not expecting to face the same emission restrictions as wealthier countries). 
 80. See id. (noting that President Bush found the Kyoto protocol unfair because it did 
not include emission targets for China or India. 
 81. See HENRY D. JACOBY ET AL., SHARING THE BURDEN OF GHG REDUCTIONS (The 
Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 2008–09), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/JacobyWeb2.pdf (presenting comparative cost data 
of various reduction policy proposals); see also STEWART & WIENER, supra note 4, at 37 
(arguing that without the participation of the United States, China, and other significant 
developing countries such as India, Brazil and Indonesia, “the efforts of the Kyoto Protocol 
participants will be swamped by the unchecked emissions increases of nonparticipants”). 
 82. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of universal coverage).  




 In fact, an efficient system would create a 
larger surplus that could then be divided equitably, making everyone better 
off.
84
 Efficiency requires universal coverage for the following reasons.  
Climate change is the outcome of a well-defined efficiency problem 
known as a negative externality.
85
 This refers to instances where an 
individual or a firm undertakes an action that imposes a cost on other 
individuals or firms without compensating them for it.
86
 The absence of 
compensation is the result of transaction costs that preclude negotiation of 
mutually beneficial deals between the affected parties.
87
 In the case of GHG 
emissions, these costs are borne by the entire global population.
88
 As a 
result, there is over-burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.
89
   
The solution to the efficiency problem is obvious. Individuals and 
firms need to be forced to internalize the cost, that is, face a private cost 
that is equal to the social cost.
90
 The social cost is the true cost of their 
actions; therefore, for them to act efficiently, this is the cost they should 
front.
91
 The most straightforward way of achieving this outcome is to 
impose a tax on GHG emissions (known as Pigouvian tax, or carbon tax in 
this context) equal to the marginal social cost.
92
 This will correct the 
externality.
93
 Firms will abate up to the point where the marginal social cost 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See infra Part VI (providing evidence that moral (equity) claims can be settled 
while maintaining the efficiency of climate change mitigation).  
 84. See id. (detailing that the fact that the surplus was generated through cooperation 
on climate change mitigation does not mean that it should be distributed according to 
vulnerability to climate change or mitigation costs). 
 85. See, e.g., Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global Warming: A Supply 
Side Approach, 15 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 360, 360–62 (2008) (describing global warming as 
the greatest externality ever). 
 86. See Wilfred Beckerman, Global Warming and International Action: An Economic 
Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 253 (Andrew Hurrell & 
Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (explaining the concept of an externality and how it applies 
with regards to global warming). 
 87. See id. (emphasizing that negative externalities could be corrected if deals between 
affected parties were negotiated).  
 88. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED 
PLANET 87–93 (2008) (showing the effects of the impact that GHG has made on the climate). 
 89. See id. at 84–85 (explaining how GHG is a result of an over-burning of fossil fuels 
and deforestation).  
 90. See HANSEN, supra note 35, at 208 (“The solution necessarily will increase the 
price of fossil fuel energy.”). 
 91. See id. (“Fossil fuels are cheapest because we do not take into account their true 
cost to society. Effects of air and water pollution on human health care are borne by the 
public.”). 
 92. See id. (“In the end, energy efficiency and carbon-free energy can surely be made 
less expensive than fossil fuels, if fossil fuels’ cost to society is included.”). 
 93. See id. (showing that if the cost to society is included through a tax or some other 
cost, the externality will be corrected).  
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of GHG emissions is equal to the marginal cost of abatement.
94
 Setting a 
price on GHG emissions is necessary in order to transmit their social costs 
to the day-by-day decisions of all firms and individuals, thereby bringing 
their activity to an efficient level.
95
  
Another mechanism, or policy tool, to solve the externality problem is 
a cap-and-trade system.
96
 Under cap-and-trade, the absorptive capacity of 
earth’s atmosphere with respect to GHGs is calculated and is allocated to 
countries in the form of emission rights (permits).
97
 The governments 
allocate (ideally, through sale) the permits to the resident firms that are 
required to use permits equivalent to their emissions.
98
 The permits are 
tradable.
99
 Firms that need to increase their emission permits can buy 
permits from firms that are willing to sell them.
100
 In effect, the buyer is 
paying a charge for polluting, while the seller is being rewarded for having 
reduced emissions.
101
 Thus, in theory, those who can reduce emissions most 
cheaply will do so, achieving the pollution reduction at the lowest cost to 
society, as in the case of a carbon tax.
102
  
It is important to emphasize that for efficiency to hold, namely, to 
deliver reduction of GHG emissions at the least cost to society, a common 
price signal is required all over the world.
103
 For example, if the marginal 
cost of reduction is lower in country A than in country B, then abatement 
costs could be reduced by doing a little more reduction in country A and a 
little less in country B.
104
 Relatively low investments in scrubbers, for 
                                                                                                                 
 94.  Id. 
 95. See id. (explaining that the current price of fossil fuels is too low and does not 
reflect the cost entailed by climate change and that “[e]nergy efficiency and carbon-free 
energy can surely be made less expensive than fossil fuels, if fossil fuels’ cost to society is 
included”). 
 96. See id. at 212–14 (presenting the cap-and-trade system as a policy tool to rectify 
the externality problem).  
 97. See id. (defining and explaining the cap-and-trade system).  
 98. See id. at 208 (“A nominal cap is defined by selling a limited number of 
certificates that allow a business or speculator to buy the fuel.”).  
 99. See id. at 212–14 (“There will be markets for these certificates on Wall Street and 
such places. And markets for derivatives.”). 
 100. See id. (explaining how there will be a market on which to trade the permits and 
that anyone who needs them will be able to procure them). 
 101. See id. (explaining that the cap-and-trade system is really a tax: those who do 
pollute have to pay it and those that do not pollute are rewarded in that they do not have to 
pay the tax and actually get paid by others eager to pay the tax). 
 102. See generally Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and 
Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421 (2005) (discussing the international effects of 
carbon leakage and emissions reduction strategies). 
 103. See id. at 443 (“These results demonstrate that implementing a policy of limiting 
carbon emissions that fails to include many regions of the world may, by ignoring the role of 
the global trading system, fail to achieve its stated ends.”). 
 104. See generally id. (evaluating emissions reduction strategies and effects). 
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example, can significantly reduce emissions in developing countries,
105
 
whereas in developed countries, such relatively inexpensive abatement 
options have already been exhausted.
106
 This efficient result will take place 
if all countries impose carbon tax at the same rate or if all countries 
participate in a global cap-and-trade system.  
Moreover, under partial participation, industries migrate from covered 
to uncovered parts of the world (known as the “leakage” problem),
107
 and 
reduction in the demand for fossil fuels in the covered countries, due to 
restrictions on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, lowers their price in the 
uncovered countries (known as the “supply-side effect”).
108
 This will 
increase fossil fuel consumption in uncovered countries, undermining 
climate change policy goals, as GHGs uniformly mix in the upper 





IV. Respective Capabilities (Distributive Justice)  
 
Many argue that wealthy countries are morally required to shoulder 
the bulk of the global mitigation and adaptation costs because they can 
more easily afford to do so.
110
 This is an ability-to-pay argument.
111
 Henry 
Shue, a distributive justice and climate change scholar, presents it in the 
following especially compelling way: “Even in an emergency one pawns 
the jewelry before selling the blankets . . . . Whatever justice may positively 
require, it does not permit that poor nations be told to sell their blankets 
[compromise their development strategies] in order that the rich nations 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See generally id.  
 106. See generally id.  
 107. See, e.g., id. at 441 (2005) (arguing that the Kyoto Protocol resulted in an increase 
in global carbon emissions). 
 108. See Sinn, supra note 85, at 362–63 (explaining how the demand reduction for 
fossil fuels lowers their price and, thus, increases their consumption). 
 109. See JOSEPH E. ALDY & ROBERT N. STAVINS, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, in 
POST-KYOTO INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 1–25 (Aldy & Stavins eds., 2009) (“Because 
GHG’s mix uniformly in the upper atmosphere, damages are completely independent of the 
location of emissions sources.”).  
 110. See Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on 
Climate Change, 71 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 463, 478 (1995) (asserting that it should be the 
first and overriding priority of developed countries to aid in the economic and social 
development of developing countries). 
 111. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1583–84 (discussing distributive justice 
and how it calls for the wealthy countries to prevent catastrophe simply because they are 
wealthy).  
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keep their jewelry [continue their unsustainable lifestyles].”
112
 Another way 
to illustrate the argument is by assuming, for example, “that we could avoid 
the possibility of catastrophic climate change and guarantee a decent quality 
of life for everyone, all at the cost of slowing down our rate of 
accumulation of purely luxury goods by two years.”
113
  
These examples may be exaggerated, as the cost of climate change 
mitigation, if incurred by rich countries alone, would require them to make 
a greater sacrifice than the equivalent of a rich individual not buying luxury 
goods for two years, unless “luxury” is broadly defined.
114
 Accepting the 
claims of developing countries in the climate change context would require 
developed countries to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars, and possibly 
much more, to developing countries.
115
 Rich countries have looming budget 
deficits and their own poor, hence, paying such amounts would not be a 
trivial sacrifice for them.
116
 But it is nevertheless true that it would be a 
much smaller sacrifice than that made by poor countries.  
The argument, however, is inaccurate when examined from a welfarist 
perspective, which is the relevant theory in the case of an ability-to-pay 
argument. When measuring the ability-to-pay of individuals for distributive 
justice purposes, we usually rely on income or wealth because innate 
earning abilities are assumed to be private information, unobservable by the 
government.
117
 When measuring income or wealth of countries, we usually 
rely on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or GDP per capita.
118
  
                                                                                                                 
 112. Grubb, supra note 110, at 478 (quoting Henry Shue, The Unavoidability of Justice, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 397 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict 
Kingsbury eds., 1992)). 
 113. Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Climate Change: An Introduction, 1 WILEY 
INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS: CLIMATE CHANGE 54, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Gardiner, Ethics, 
An Introduction]. 
 114. See id. (“This might satisfy the ‘care for little gains’ condition even if the cost of 
those luxury goods in dollar terms were very large.”). 
 115. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1608 (“The key point is that such an 
approach would represent a significant transfer of resources from the United States to other 
nations—indeed, the transfer would be worth hundreds of billions of dollars and perhaps 
more.”); see also BERT METZ, CONTROLLING CLIMATE CHANGE 343 (2010) (discussing the 
investment in developing countries by the United States and how much more these 
developing countries will need).  
 116. See id. (“[T]here is no sign that the United States wants to give hundreds of 
billions of dollars to China or India. Indeed, any proposal that it should do so, in [any 
context], would be unpopular to say the least; domestic political constraints would probably 
doom any such proposal.”). 
 117. See James Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 
38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1971) (presenting optimal design of the tax and transfer 
system).  
 118. See generally SACHS, supra note 88 (using GDP per capita throughout the book to 
compare the wealth of nations).   
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According to public finance literature, differential commodity taxation 
should not be used in the presence of an optimal income tax.
119
 A similar 
argument was made against the use of legal rules for redistribution 
purposes, namely, that legal rules, like commodity taxation, should not be 
equity-informed and should only be used to correct market failures, such as 
externalities (in analogy to Pigouvian taxation), serving an efficiency 
cause.
120
 The idea is that relying on anything other than income is 
redundant because it does not provide the government with any additional 




There are qualifications to this argument. In case there is something 
that is observable by the government and is correlated with individual’s 
innate abilities, not through income, it could be used for redistribution 
purposes.
122
 For example, if consumption patterns differed across 
households with different innate earning abilities, controlling for other 
differences (notably, differences in income), differential commodity 
taxation could enhance welfare.
123
 In such a case, households with the same 
level of income but different innate earning abilities would have different 
consumption patterns.
124
 The consumption pattern, observed by the 
government, would provide the government with information regarding 




Applying this analysis to countries, it is difficult to see what relevant 
information about a country’s ability-to-pay could be learned from its GHG 
mitigation or adaptation costs. Surely, these costs, like any other costs, 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See A.B. Atkinson & Joseph Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus 
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 74 (1976) (“If a general income tax function may be 
chosen by the government, we have shown that, where the utility function is separable 
between labor and all commodities, no indirect taxes need be employed.”). “In this case, the 
use of consumption of particular commodities as a screening device offers no benefit.” Id. 
 120. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than 
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994) 
(“Redistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income tax system than 
through the use of legal rules, even when redistributive taxes distort behavior.”). 
 121. See Mirrlees, supra note 117, at 175 (“One might obtain information about a man's 
income-earning potential from his apparent I.Q., the number of his degrees, his address, age 
or colour: but the natural, and one would suppose the most reliable, indicator of his income-
earning potential is his income.”). 
 122. See id. at 207 (discussing that there are other factors than income that the 
government could consider when levying taxes). 
 123. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 119, at 57 (“In a world where income and 
wages are unobservable, but purchases of certain luxuries are observable, the latter may 
provide the best screening device.”) 
 124.   Id.  
 125.  Id. 
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reduce the country’s wealth. But the effect of these costs on the country’s 
ability-to-pay operates through its wealth.  
Climate change is only one of many factors that affect a nation’s 
wealth.
126
 Some poor countries that will incur significant adaptation costs 
will nevertheless be wealthier than other poor countries with lower climate 
change-related costs.
127
 The latter should be helped first. 
Redistribution from rich to poor should be based on the relative overall 
well-being of the poor and not on one specific factor.
128
 Rich countries will 
suffer less than poor countries from climate change, in the short term, 
because they have more resources to adapt to the change (e.g., building 
walls), are less dependent on agriculture, and generally tend to be located in 
cooler and higher areas.
129
 But all countries, rich and poor, vary greatly in 
the extent to which they are expected to be affected by climate change, with 
some countries even benefiting from it in the short term.
130
  
The important point, which is possibly unintuitive as it is absent from 
the climate change literature, is that even if there was a perfect correlation 
between mitigation and adaptation costs and countries’ poverty (as 
measured, for example, according to GDP per capita), consideration of 
distributive justice could not be used to justify basing transfers to 
developing countries on such costs. These costs do not add any information 
about the ability-to-pay of these countries that was not already captured in 
their wealth.  
The above analysis does not mean that redistribution from rich to poor 
countries is not justified. Quite the opposite. National boundaries are 
irrelevant under welfarism, which requires the application of distributive 
justice to the entire world.
131
 But in terms of providing moral justification, 
climate change is irrelevant.
132
 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See SACHS, supra note 88, at 230–31 (describing that an escape from extreme 
poverty requires investment in things other than climate change).  
 127. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1582 (noting “that some nations would 
benefit far more than others from world-wide reductions”). 
 128. See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 74 (“The rich indeed have an obligation 
to help the poor, but they should fulfill this obligation in the best possible way . . . . It is 
conceivable that climate change policies will turn out to be the best way to help poor 
people.”). 
 129. See id. at 21–22 (describing why poor nations are likely to suffer the most from 
climate change).  
 130. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1608 (showing how some countries, such 
as Russia due to the increase in temperature and subsequent increase in agricultural 
productivity, are benefitted by the climate change).  
 131. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 379 
(2008) (explaining that national boundaries have practical and political significance but no 
clear ethical relevance); see also PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF 
GLOBALIZATION 154–60 (2004) (advocating the development of the ethical foundations of 
the coming era of a single world community); CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND 
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In reality we see that very little global redistribution takes place.
133
 
This may be the result of policies based on non-welfarist ethics, such as 
statism,
134
 or could be explained within the welfarist framework by an 
assumption that national policymakers assign lower weight to the welfare of 
foreigners compared to that of their residents or citizens.
135
  
Redistribution is clearly required, not only under cosmopolitanism and 
welfarism, but even under statism, when it is based on humanitarian duties, 
such as starvation or severe malnutrition from flooding or drought.
136
 
Climate change could have such effects, and rich countries should certainly 
help poor countries finance the huge costs of adaptation, as preventive 
action is more cost effective than emergency action, and poor countries lack 
the necessary resources.
137
 But the reason for redistribution would then be 
poverty, not its causes. 
This does not mean that developed countries should only transfer cash 
to alleviated their poverty and refrain from helping them through climate 
                                                                                                                 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 181–82 (1979) (showing that cosmopolitanism also supports 
global distributive justice by promoting principles of international distributive justice that 
establish a fair division of natural resources, income, and wealth among persons living in 
different countries); THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 122–23 (2008) 
(arguing that the global rich have violated a negative duty which is the duty not to contribute 
to the imposition of a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably renders the 
basic socioeconomic rights of other human beings unfulfilled). 
 132. See KAPLOW, supra note 131, at 347 (“Considered first is the doctrine referred to 
as welfarism, under which social welfare is taken to depend on individuals’ levels of well-
being and nothing else.”).  
 133.  See generally SACHS, supra note 88 (showing as evidence the relatively low 
percentage of foreign aid in developed countries’ budgets).   
 134. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 116 (1999) (rejecting the idea of an 
indefinite international redistribution duty and the global application of his difference 
principle, mainly due to the current lack of a world government and a global legal system); 
see also Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 125–26 
(2005) (drawing a distinction between humanitarian duties, which we owe to fellow human 
beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition, and obligations of justice, which 
are limited to the nation-state). 
 135. See KAPLOW, supra note 131, at 379–82 (suggesting that consideration of 
incentives may also limit the extent of global redistribution because differences in well-
being across nations partially reflect differences in prior investments, such as in education, 
and it would be optimal to protect winners’ claims to some degree). 
 136. See id. at 354–56 (describing the moral intuitions that contribute to a requirement 
of redistribution based on humanitarian duties).  
 137. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1583 (using an example of an impending 
asteriod to show the importance of preparation now: “[b]ut many scientists believe that the 
best approach, considering relevant costs and benefits, is to start immediately to build 
technology that will divert the asteroid”). The poorest countries will be hit earliest and 
hardest by climate change, and they are particularly short of the resources requires to 
manage a changing climate. 
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change policies, such as limiting global GHG emissions and financing 
adaptation in developing countries.
138
 The explanation is as follows.   
An unconditioned cash transfer is generally better than a transfer of a 
benefit in-kind or a cash transfer that is conditioned on the recipient’s 
actions (a targeted transfer) because the former allows the recipient to 
spend the money on whatever maximizes its utility.
139
 A transfer in-kind 
may be justified in certain circumstances, such as in the case the benefit 
entails positive externalities, costs the provider less than what it is worth to 
the recipient, serves to overcome asymmetric information, or is a welfare 
ordeal.  
Redistribution from rich to poor countries through climate change 
policies is a form of a transfer in-kind or a targeted cash transfer. It may be 
justified on the basis of most, if not all, of the reasons mentioned above. 
  
A. Mitigation, Adaptation, and Redistribution 
 
When a country limits its GHG emissions, it incurs mitigation cost, but 
the resulting benefits are distributed globally, as the atmosphere is a global 
public good.
140
 For efficiency reasons, explained in Part II above, 
mitigation should be performed on a global basis, so that the marginal cost 
of GHG emissions would be the same all over the world.
141
  
This could be achieved in more than one way, but for presentation 
purposes I will assume it is achieved through a carbon tax. The tax rate 
would be set to equal the marginal harm from climate change.
142
 This tax 
rate would not necessarily be the optimal rate from the perspective of each 
particular country for many reasons, including the following: the impact of 
climate change is expected to differ across countries,
143
 and countries differ 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See id. at 1591 (“We cannot exclude the possibility that desirable redistribution is 
more likely to occur through climate change policy than otherwise, or to be accomplished 
more effectively through climate policy than through direct foreign aid.”).  
 139. See id. at 1584–85 (“Other things being equal, the more sensible kind of 
redistribution would be a cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see 
fit.”). 
 140. See id. at 1610 (“Similarly, one might think that all states should receive the same 
net benefit from greenhouse gas abatement.”). 
 141. See supra Part III (explaining why, for efficiency reasons, mitigation should be 
performed on a global basis).  
 142. See Sinn, supra note 85, at 383 (“The theoretically correct value of the unit tax 
that would internalize the marginal externalities from global warming would have to be 
equal to the present value of the flow of damages it causes.”). 
 143. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1587 (discussing and giving examples of 
the fact that not all countries will be hurt by the climate change and some countries will even 
be positively affected). The climate change effects are expected to be harsher, in the near to 
medium time range, on developing countries, which means that based on this factor by itself, 
the optimal global tax rate would be higher (lower) than optimal for the developed 
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in their opportunity costs,
144
 in their GHG mitigation costs,
145
 in their GHG 
intensity,
146
 and in the extent to which they shift mitigation costs to 




It is therefore quite complicated to determine to what extent a global 
mitigation scheme makes a specific country better or worse off. Law 
professors Posner and Sunstein assume that the United States would be a 
net loser under a global mitigation scheme.
148
 I do not find this assumption 
to be plausible. Without U.S. participation, China and other developing 
countries are unlikely to participate in a global GHG emissions mitigation 
scheme.
149
 The choice faced by the United States is therefore between (a) 
continued global emissions more or less at the business-as-usual (BAU) 
rates, if no global agreement is reached or (b) a universal agreement that 
would be set at the optimal global tax rate.
150
 It seems clear that the United 
States would be better off under the latter option for the following two 
reasons: First, because the terrible consequences suffered by hundreds of 
millions of people in other parts of the world are likely to have indirect 
effects on the United States, due to globalization and security issues.
151
 
                                                                                                                 
(developing) countries as a group. But this depends on how we account for time. If we take a 
longer time perspective, the developed countries will incur much higher costs.       
 144. See Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 60–61 (factoring in 
opportunity cost to the discussion and explaining that developing countries have greater 
opportunity costs and, thus, other more important things to spend money on instead of GHG 
mitigation).  
 145. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1611 (using the Kyoto Protocol, where 
the United States would have paid eighty percent of the total, as an example to demonstrate 
that the United States would pay substantially more in mitigation than other countries).  
 146. See ALDY & STAVINS, supra note 109, at 19–20 (“Developing countries have a key 
role to play in efforts to address climate change—both because they could be strongly 
affected by future damages and because they account for an increasing share of global 
emissions.”). Developed countries emit fewer GHG per unit of GDP, that is, use more fossil 
fuel energy to produce GDP. Id. This makes it relatively more difficult for developing 
countries to meet the global standard. Id.   
 147. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION: POLICIES AND OPTIONS FOR GLOBAL ACTION BEYOND 2012 88–89 
(2009).   
 148. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1567–69 (explaining that a global 
mitigation scheme would not be optimal for the United States and that they would probably 
be disadvantaged by it). 
 149. See id. at 1607–08 (discussing China and their reluctance to take blame for the 
climate change situation due to their incredibly low per capita GHG emission).  
 150. See id. at 1574–75 (laying out and explaining the most credible options for 
retribution that the United States, as well as other countries, have).  
 151. See id. at 1567–71 (expounding upon the choices that the United States has and 
concluding that a global mitigation scheme, though not extremely beneficial for the United 
States, is probably the most viable option). 
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Second, an increase in temperature above moderate levels, which is the 
likely outcome of a failure to reach international cooperation, will result in 
grave consequences to the developed countries, including the United 
States.
152
 Their losses, measured in monetary terms, will be much greater 
than those of the developing countries.
153
   
It is possible to make a global mitigation scheme distributionally-
neutral through transfer payments.
154
 As the aggregate benefits exceed the 
aggregate costs, it would also assure that no country would be a net-loser.
155
 
By definition, such transfer payments do not redistribute wealth from rich 
to poor countries.
156
 Developing countries that receive such payments, 
receive them as compensation for their participation in the effort of creating 
a global public good.
157
  
In contrast, transfers from developed to developing countries to 
finance adaptation can only be motivated by distributive justice. Adaptation 
does not require global cooperation. It is not subject to free riding. Contrary 
to mitigation—an activity that confers benefits on the entire globe—
adaptation has no external effects. When a country takes adaptation 
measures it has no effect on other countries. It is a policy that benefits its 
own residents alone. Therefore, when developed countries pay for 
adaptation that takes place in developing countries, they do so only for 
distributive justice purposes. Outside the theory of welfare-economics this 
transfer may be justified on the basis of needs, according to a general 
standard to which people or nations are entitled, or simply as an act of 
generosity.   
Developing countries prefer to see it differently.
158
 They would like to 
view the commitment of developed countries towards them to be based on a 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See METZ, supra note 115, at 12–20 (detailing the impact of future climate change 
on developed countries). In addition, there are critical thresholds, or tipping points, in the 
climate system. When the system reaches a tipping point, catastrophes on a global scale will 
be unavoidable.  Id. 
 153. See id. at 78–79 (explaining that even though rich countries, such as the United 
States, can take measures to protect people, these measures will be extremely costly and, 
thus, in monetary terms, they will have greater losses than developing countries). 
 154. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1610 (“If . . . some states receive a large 
benefit (because they benefit more from a given level of abatement or can reduce their 
greenhouse gases to an agreed-upon level at low cost) and other[s] . . . very little, the first 
group of states should make a side payment to the second group.”). 
 155. See id.  
 156. See id.  
 157. See id. at 1608–09 (“One answer is that the gift would represent a side-payment, 
designed to ensure that developing nations—above all China—participate in the deal.”).   
 158. See id.at 1591–1602 (discussing the doctrine of corrective justice and the notion 
that developing countries particularly blame developed countries for the current climate 
change problem).  
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stronger notion of entitlement—compensatory justice.
159
 According to this 
notion, developed countries are required to indemnify costs that they 
unduly inflicted upon the developing countries and may even be legally 





V. Differentiated Responsibilities (Corrective Justice) 
 
A. Possible Justifications for Using a Fairness Principle 
 
Standard welfare-economics analysis rejects any principle whose 
application depends on the use of information other than information about 
well-being.
161
 Social policies, notably, legal rules, should be selected 
entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of individuals.
162
 
Accordingly, notions of fairness, which are reasons that are not reducible to 
concerns about individuals’ well-being, should receive no independent 
weight in policy analysis.
163
 
In light of the above, tort law should be designed and used only 
according to its influence on individuals’ well-being.
164
 Relying on notions 
such as corrective justice is either redundant when the result is the same as 
under distributive justice or harmful when the outcomes differ.
165
 
Corrective justice requires the reversal of wrongful changes to an initial 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 60–62 (1999) (discussing the 
idea of well-being as one of the merits within the context of the utilitarian approach to 
freedom and the foundation of justice). Non-standard welfare-economics analysis embraced 
a broader perspective on the objectives of policy, such as capabilities and freedom. Cf. Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the 
Pareto Principle, 109 J. POLITICAL ECON. 281, 282 (2001) (suggesting the growing tension 
between the concern for an individual’s well-being and factors outside of their well-being 
affecting social welfare). 
 162. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002) 
(“The hallmark of welfare economics is that policies are assessed exclusively in terms of 
their effects on the well-being of individuals. Accordingly, whatever is relevant to 
individuals’ well-being is relevant under welfare economics. . . .”). 
 163. See id. at 56 (discussing the effects of the Pareto Principle on determining policy 
choices based on the assumption that it is not beneficial to make everyone worse off).  
 164. See id. at 86 (stating that “the effects of tort law are relevant to the extent that they 
influence individuals’ well-being”). 
 165. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 TORONTO L.J. 
349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice] (discussing the interplay between 
corrective justice and distributive justice). 
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distribution of resources.
166
 If, on the one hand, some initial distribution of 
resources is just, then corrective justice seemingly does no more than 
require that we return individuals to the position to which they are entitled, 
merely as a matter of distributive justice.
167
 If, on the other hand, an initial 
distribution of resources is unjust, then corrective justice seemingly requires 
that we sustain or enforce an unjust distribution.
168
  
So what could justify the use of a corrective justice notion under a 
welfare-economics analysis? Practical constraints. Welfare-economics 
analysis is based on the assumption that legal rules (e.g., tort law) maximize 
efficiency.
169
 For example, in the context of tort law, legal rules are 
designed to assure optimal deterrence.
170
 The reason legal rules can 
generally ignore redistribution is the existence of a tax-and-transfer system 
that operates simultaneously and redistributes resources to maximize 
society’s welfare function.
171
 When applying this analysis to the global 
context we should acknowledge that the tax-and-transfer system has no 
presence. Developing countries therefore look for additional arguments and 
try to apply to additional institutions (e.g., courts) in an effort to increase 
the transfers to them from the developed countries. 
Another reason for the use by developing countries of a corrective 
justice argument is its intuitive appeal to our moral instincts.  
 
B. Is the Intuition Justified? 
 
According to Ernest J. Weinrib, one of the leading scholars on 
corrective justice, the situation of GHG emissions does not fit a corrective 
justice claim.
172
 For corrective justice purposes we have to establish 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See id. at 350 (explaining that for a remedy to conform to corrective justice, it 
must be aimed at both parties, in a manner in which the court takes away the wrongful gain 
of one party and makes good the other party’s loss).  
 167. See id. at 351–52 (discussing the different functions and effects of corrective 
justice versus distributive justice). 
 168. See id. at 352 (“The consequence of this contrast between corrective and 
distributive justice is that no distributive consideration can serve as a justification for 
holding one person liable to another.”). 
 169. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 162, at 5 (“[L]egal rules are assessed by 
reference to wealth maximization or efficiency . . . .”). 
 170. See id. at 98 (discussing rules in tort law, whether just or unjust, that result in 
greater deterrence of wrongful acts). 
 171. See id. at 460 (stating that distributive concerns are addressed effectively through 
the income tax and transfer system). 
 172. Discussion with Ernest J. Weinrib, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (May 
12, 2011).   
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ownership rights and fault,
173
 and we need to match specific victims and 
injurers.
174
 Ownership rights and fault are two substantive requirements, 
analyzed below,
175
 whereas the matching is merely a technical 
requirement.
176
 Nevertheless, the matching requirement is the one that 
exposes the inappropriateness of the use of corrective justice in the climate 
change context.
177
    
Corrective justice is an idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted 
by one person on another.
178
 This rectification operates correlatively on 
both parties.
179
 The central feature of a system of liability is that any 
liability of a particular defendant is simultaneously a liability to a particular 
plaintiff.
180
 In holding the defendant liable to the plaintiff, the court is 
making not two separate judgments (one that awards something to the 
plaintiff and the other that coincidentally takes the same from the 
defendant), but a single judgment that embraces both parties in their 
interrelationship.
181
 Each party’s position is intelligible only in the light of 
the position of the other.
182
 The defendant cannot be thought of as liable 
without reference to a plaintiff in whose favor such liability runs.
183
 




It is difficult to imagine how countries could be matched in this way. 
A high GHG-emitting country inflicts harm on the entire global population, 
including its own residents. All countries are victimized to some extent by 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 175 (1995) [hereinafter 
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW] (discussing the idea of corrective justice as a regime of rights and 
the idea of ownership as leading to a strict liability standard). 
 174. See id. at 71 (discussing the inherent link between a victim’s loss and the injurer’s 
gain). 
 175. See id. at 175–76 (discussing the strict liability claims from a property 
perspective). 
 176. See id. at 71 (describing Aristotle’s mathematical interpretation of the forms of 
justice). 
 177. See id. at 72 (“No single mathematical operation combines proportionate and 
quantitative equality[.]”).    
 178. See Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 165 (“[C]orrective justice has a 
rectifactory function. By correcting the injustice that the defendant has inflicted on the 
plaintiff, corrective justice asserts a connection between the remedy and the wrong.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 173 at 114–22; see also Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice, supra note 165, at 349.  
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the emissions of other countries. Clearly, corrective justice was designed to 




C. Applying Tort Law More Generally 
 
Even if corrective justice does not fit the climate change case, tort law 
analysis could still be helpful in clarifying and assessing the strength of 
moral claims that could be raised by developing countries against 
developed ones.  
In the context of climate change, tort law arguments require that 
nations which contributed to the buildup of GHG in the atmosphere, more 




I argue that to make the case that emissions were excessive we have to 
adopt some benchmark, such as emissions per-capita. Otherwise it is 
impossible to define in what sense nations contributed more or less to the 
buildup of GHG in the atmosphere. This would be true even if we do not 
assign fault. We all emit GHGs, even simply by breathing; hence we all 
contribute to whatever harm takes place.
187
 In order for an individual to be 
responsible (though not necessarily liable) to another for the harm caused 
by her emissions, we need to define by what measure her emissions were 
greater than his. And because the claims are brought by countries against 
other countries, we need to find a way to compare the aggregate emissions 
of their residents.  
Simple per-capita measurement, however, cannot be considered fair.
188
 
There are differences between countries in the amount of GHGs their 
residents would need to emit to maintain an equal standard of living.
189
 
Thus, for example, merely accounting for heating homes in cold countries 
and cooling them in very warm countries would require quite significant 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 173 at 73 (“In corrective justice the unity 
of the plaintiff-defendant relationship lies in the very correlativity of doing and suffering 
harm.”).   
 186. See Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 580 
(2004) [hereinafter Gardiner, Global Climate Change] (reasoning that developed countries 
have overused the earth’s capacity to absorb emissions, such that “justice seems to require 
that the developed countries compensate the less developed for this overuse”). 
 187. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1591–1601 (providing examples of what 
actions lead to greenhouse gas emissions). 
 188. See Gardiner, Global Climate Change, supra note 186, at 584 (arguing that a 
major concern with the per capita proposal is that it “does not take into account the fact that 
emissions may play very different roles in people’s lives”). “In particular, some emissions 
are used to produce luxury items, whereas others are necessary for most people’s survival.” 
Id. 
 189. Id.   
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fairness-based adjustments to the per-capita measurement.
190
 This, unless 
we assume that residence is a matter of choice and individuals should be 
held responsible for the larger amounts of GHGs they emitted due to their 
choice of residence. I believe that for most people residence is not a matter 
of choice. Hence, adjusting the per-capita emission measure is required, but 
would be highly controversial and difficult to agree on.  
Calculating the adjusted emissions per-capita measurement described 
above in a way that is relevant to a tort claim would be especially difficult 
because such claims are backward-looking.
191
 We need to find the relevant 
information for past years. Fairness would require that GHG emissions be 
defined to include any activity that increases the GHG concentration in the 
atmosphere, as this is what creates the harm.
192
 It should therefore include 
land use changes, such as deforestation, as they too have very significant 
effects on GHG concentration.
193
 Because what matters is the effect of 
human behavior on GHG concentration in the atmosphere, there should be 
no difference between cutting down trees and driving a car.
194
 Both increase 
GHG concentration.
195
 Weisbach, who looked for such data, was only able 
to find data on emissions from land use change between 1950 and 2000.
196
 
If we want to raise tort claims based on emissions that took place prior to 
1950, we need to take into consideration our inability to measure the 
relative per-capita emissions of quite a few countries.
197
  
There will probably be a need to check the average global per-capita 
emissions year by year and measure the deviation of each nation from the 
average. For each country, this deviation would then be multiplied by its 
number of residents during that year to calculate the aggregate amount of 
GHG emissions it emitted above or below the benchmark. Each country 
would then be required to pay (in case it emitted above the average) or be 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Gardiner, Global Climate Change, supra note 186, at 579 (arguing that the 
first issue in the context of responsibility for climate change to be considered is “backward-
looking considerations”). 
 192. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1591–1601 (providing examples of what 
actions lead to greenhouse gas emissions). 
 193. See David Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate 
Change 6 (The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Discussion Paper 10-
39, 2010) (discussing land use changes).   
 194. See id. at 7 (“Any good measure of responsibility should consider all sources of 
climate change, to the extent possible.”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See generally WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CAIT: GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES & 
METHODS (2010), http://cait.wri.org/downloads/cait_ghgs.pdf (displaying the Climate 
Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 197. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at 8 (discussing why data from years prior to 1950 
is sparse and inadequate). 
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entitled to receive a payment from the others (in case it emitted below the 
average). This is a retroactive equal distribution allocation mechanism 
which may be thought is what tort law is supposed to achieve, namely, 
rectify the transactional imbalance.  
Next we need to assess the harm. This is very complicated for at least 
two reasons. First, we need to be able to put a dollar value on the cost that 
each country will incur due to climate change which is the outcome of the 
above average emissions of that country in the relevant years. Second, the 
activity that generated the GHG emissions benefited not only those who 
engaged in it, but also others.
198
 The United States, for example, contributed 
more than its share in terms of population to the increase in GHG 
concentration,
199
 but some of the emissions were generated by activity that 
had positive spillover effects on other countries,
200
 including countries with 
low per-capita emissions. It seems that fairness would require offsetting the 
harm caused by the GHG emissions with the benefit derived via spillovers 
from the activity that generated the emissions.
201
 I am not sure that such a 
calculation is possible, and even if it were, it would probably be very 
difficult to reach an international agreement on how it should be made.  
Developing countries could argue that it is clear that the positive 
spillovers were insignificant, pointing to the differences in GDP per 
capita.
202
 The weakness of such an argument is that there could be many 
other explanations as to why certain countries are rich while other are poor. 
The earlier and greater use of fossil energy is only one of them and may not 
even be that prominent.
203
   
It might be possible to calculate the harm if we interpret the tort claim 
a bit differently. We could argue that the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb 
GHG without adverse effects is limited and that this is a common resource. 
Developed countries took more than their fair share of this resource and by 
doing so denied developing countries their fair share and should therefore 
compensate them. Such a claim would require calculation of what is left of 
                                                                                                                 
 198.  See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 106 (“Many of these benefits are 
positive externalities”).  
 199.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1604 (listing the United States as the 
world’s seventh highest per capita emitter of GHGs in 2004). 
 200. See id. at 1594 (“[I]f past generations of Americans have imposed costs on the rest 
of the world, they have also conferred substantial benefits.”). 
 201. See id. at 1594 (“As long as the costs are being toted up, the benefits should be as 
well, and used to offset the requirements of corrective justice.”).  
 202. See, e.g., id. at 1606 (“China might well urge that its low per capita emissions rate 
. . . should be taken into account in deciding on appropriate policy.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to 
Riches, 89 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1216, 1216 (1999) (explaining that the reason many poor 
countries do not use better technologies to improve their wealth is due to protected 
monopoly rights). 
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the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and a comparison of it to how 
much was used by past emitters.
204
 These data are available.
205
 The 
difficulty with this approach is conceptual. It requires answering the very 
difficult question of how to allocate emission rights across countries. This 
question is beyond the scope of this paper. I will merely note that there 
seems to be no clear normative theory to guide us on it. The equal per-
capita basis allocation, which is highly popular with scholars and the 
developing world,
206
 cannot be defended on normative grounds. 
 
D. Can a Tort Claim be Directed at a Collective? 
 
An often-repeated fairness-based objection to the use of tort claims in 
the climate change context is that it is unfair to aggregate every individual’s 
emissions in each country.
207
 The tort claim is directed at the country and 
thereby to all individuals who currently reside in it, but those individuals 
may differ sharply in their GHG emissions. Some individuals may have 
consumed only relatively little electricity and did not own a vehicle, while 
others emitted a lot.  
I do not find this argument convincing. Under the tort claim, if 
successful, the state will be required to pay compensation. This will be paid 
from revenue raised by its tax system. It is the government’s responsibility 
toward its residents to raise the taxes according to each individual’s 
emissions. In the likely case that the government did not do so, it is the 
government’s fault that it did not impose taxes on GHG emissions. The 
citizens can raise claims against their own government for not making 
people pay for the real cost of their activities, but they cannot raise any 
claims against other countries that request compensation based on the harm 
that was caused to them. As for the responsibility of people for the 
wrongful acts of their governments, there are scholars who argue that in a 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See Wallace S. Broecker, CO2 Arithmetic, 315 SCI. 1371 (2007) (calculating 
necessary GHG emission limits based on the concept of a “carbon pie”). 
 205. Id.  
 206. See Eric Neumayer, In Defense of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185, 187 (2000) (“That emission rights should be 
allocated on an equal per capita basis and that historical differences in emissions should also 
be accounted for is . . . the shared view of almost every scholar and policy maker from the 
developing world.”). 
 207. See id. at 188 (suggesting that one objection to accountability “holds that present 
generation of developed countries must not be held accountable for something that was 
caused not by themselves, but by individuals in the past”). 
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democracy individuals may be held liable, unless they did whatever they 
could (e.g., voting and demonstrating) against it.
208
   
Another related aspect has to do with time.
209
 Some of the current 
residents were not residents of that country at the time the GHG emissions 
took place.
210
 They may have been residents of a different country. Some 
people were born only later. How can these people be responsible for 
emissions that took place before they were born or immigrated to the 
country?  
A possible justification is that people who immigrate to a country, or 
are born there, benefit from its wealth. Past GHG emissions contributed to 
the economic growth of the country, and they benefit from it. A state is an 
institution that outlives its residents. New residents, by immigration or 
birth, inherit both rights and responsibilities. An argument by 
environmental philosopher Stephen Gardiner is stated as follows: “Put most 
baldly, if we are not responsible for at least some of the debts incurred by 
our ancestors, why are we entitled to inherit all of the benefits of their 
activities? Hence, if we disavow their emissions, must we also relinquish 
the territory and infrastructure they left to us?”
211
 Shue provides the 
example of an individual who inherited a suit from his father and it turned 
out that his father had not paid the tailor.
212
 Shue argues that he would be 
bound to pay the tailor
213
 and that this would be the case even if the father 
did not pay the tailor because he mistakenly thought the suit was gift.
214
   
 
E. Liability (Fault) 
 
Assuming we can solve the measurement problems, there is a need to 
distinguish between responsibility and liability. As will be discussed below, 
it is much easier to base a tort law-inspired moral claim on responsibility 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 300–01 (1977) (stating that a 
citizen’s lack of participating, in voting in particular, renders them responsible for the 
subsequent wrongful actions that result from their non-participation).  
 209. See Neumayer, supra note 206, at 188 (“A second objection holds that the present 
generation of developed countries must not be held accountable for something that was 
caused not by themselves, but by individuals in the past who are long since dead.”). 
 210. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1593 (“The basic problem for corrective 
justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot be punished or held responsible for their behavior, or 
forced to compensate those they have harmed.”).   
 211. Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 57.  
 212.  Henry Shue, Historical Responsibility (Technical Briefing for Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention [AWG-LCA], SBSTA, 
UNFCC, Bonn, 4 June 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/adhocworkinggroups/lca/application/pdf/1shuerev.pdf. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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than to prove fault.
215
 In tort law, we usually require fault.
216
 Therefore, if 
we look to the law as our normative guide, we should generally raise claims 
only with regard to faulty behavior.  
Once we require fault, there is a very strong fairness-based case to 
limit tort claims to emissions that took place only in recent years.
217
 The 
reason is simple. Until relatively recently, developed countries were not 
(and could not be) aware of the effects of GHG emissions and so should not 
be held accountable for past emissions. Nor could they have known that 
fossil fuels would remain essential to the economy for centuries to come: 
their emissions only became part of a problem because economies 
continued to depend on fossil fuels.
218
 What is the cut-off date? Before what 
point should emitters not be blamed for emissions? There are various 
possible dates. In my opinion, the earliest possible date is 1992, when 
nearly all countries of the world signed the UNFCCC,
219
 which stated that 
“[t]he Parties to this Convention [are] [c]oncerned that human activities 
have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse 
effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the 





F. What would be Regarded as Negligent Behavior? 
 
Posner and Sunstein argue that on the individual level, each GHG-
emitting activity cannot be regarded as negligent if the benefit the 
individual derived from the activity was greater than what she would have 
been required to pay under a carbon tax regime, had such a system been in 
place.
221
 Assuming that a carbon tax would have added ten cents to the 
price of a gallon of gas,
222
 Posner and Sunstein argue that “a person is 
negligent when she drives rather than walks if the benefit she obtains from 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See infra Part IV.G. 
 216. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at 28 (“Most notions of responsibility require fault. 
This is deeply embedded in tort law.”). 
 217. See id. at 28–30 (discussing why fault-based claims are improbable in the context 
of greenhouse gas emissions).  
 218. See Mathias Risse, Who Should Shoulder the Burden? Global Climate Change and 
Common Ownership of the Earth (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, Working Paper 
No. RWP08-075, 2008) (mentioning the “considerable” amount of carbon dioxide that has 
been a result of burning fossil fuels).  
 219. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1.   
 220. Id. 
 221. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1600. 
 222. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 196 (2008) (relying on an 
estimate by Nordhaus of what would be the optimal carbon tax in 2010). 
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driving is less than ten cents per gallon consumed. The argument could be 
extended to the choice of driving rather than using convenient forms of 
public transportation and to other activities as well.”
223
  
This, however, is merely another version of the argument against 
aggregation which I find to be problematic. This time, the argument is also 
against aggregation of an individual’s many separate acts. The carbon tax is 
a Pigouvian tax.
224
 Its main purpose is not to raise revenue, but to change 
individuals’ behavior.
225
 The example gives the impression that the tax will 
be too small to change anyone’s behavior.
226
 But this would mean that 
either everyone in the United States is behaving efficiently, fully 
internalizing the costs (in terms of climate change) of their behavior, or that 
the tax is too low, namely, that it is not set at the optimal rate.
227
 Plausibly 
assuming that a tax set at the optimal rate would change many individuals’ 
behavior, this aggregate change in behavior represents the negligence, 
measured collectively.
228
 It can then be arbitrarily attributed to the 
individuals who form the group.  
Posner and Sunstein also argue as follows: 
 
If many or most people fail to pay a carbon tax or (as we argue) fail to 
act as if they pay it by cutting back on less important activities that 
produce greenhouse gases, then the contribution of Americans who do 
this is quite small. And if this is the case, it cannot be considered 
negligent for Americans to fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emitting 
activities. Put differently, it is not negligent to fail to contribute to a 
public good if not enough others are doing similarly, so that the public 




I do not find this argument convincing. First, the underlying 
assumption that climate change is an all-or-nothing phenomenon is wrong. 
If “the public good was not created,”
230
 namely, if dangerous climate 
change is taking place, any additional emission increases the harm. This is 
not equivalent to the case (analyzed by philosophers, as will be described 
below)
231
 where many people kill a person together, each contributing a 
little to the killing, and some of them, unknowingly, do so after the person 
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 224. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at, 37 (explaining the theory behind Pigouvian tax). 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1600 (citing Matthew D. Alder, Corrective 
Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1862–63 (2007)).   
 230. Id. 
 231. See infra Part IV.G–H. 




 The earth is not dead yet, so adding excessive emissions 
is morally wrong.  
Even assuming that the emissions were so severe that nothing could be 
done to save the planet, their behavior would have been negligent according 
to the following classic statement by Parfit: “Even if an act harms no one, 
this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm 
other people.”
233
 In the case of a jointly harmful act, the order in which the 
agents contribute to that harm is irrelevant in the moral assessment of the 
agents’ behavior.
234
 The American individuals who emit beyond their 
baseline per-capita emissions contribute to the harm, together with all other 
individuals in the world who exceed their per-capita level. Each one of 




As argued above, the law generally requires liability, namely, fault.
235
 
Even when strict liability is the legal rule, often the underlying rationale is 
that the activity was faulty, even if, to save costs, proving this is not 
required.
236
 Moral considerations, however, can be broader than the legal 
system. I do not think that developing countries should base their claims on 
arguments that cannot be supported by the law, but it is not my opinion that 
matters. What matters, as explained in the Introduction, is what developing 




We discussed a notion of fairness.
238
 As such, it is based on our sense 
of what is right and wrong. In the tort context, it invokes the intuitive 
principle that one should “clean up one’s own mess,” or the “you broke it, 
                                                                                                                 
 232. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70 (1984) (philosophizing 
over the individualization of multi-person activities). 
 233. Id.; see also STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE 165 (2008) (quoting 
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70 (1984)).  
 234. See VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 233, at 165 (“Where joint contributions to a 
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 235. See supra Part IV.E. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Part I. 
 238. See supra Part IV.A. 
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you fix it” rationale.
239
 This suggests that the developed (i.e., industrialized) 
countries should bear the costs imposed by their past emissions.
240
  
When responsibility, not liability, is the guiding norm, the argument 
against the application of tort to emissions before 1992 loses much of its 
force.
241
 It is clear that past emitters cannot be blamed, but it is not clear 
that they do not have a moral responsibility to correct whatever wrong they 
did, even if it was unintentional.  
As illustrated by Gardiner,  
 
If I accidentally break something of yours, we usually think that I have 
some obligation to fix it, even if I was ignorant that my behavior was 
dangerous, and perhaps even if I could not have known. It remains true 
that I broke it, and in many contexts that is sufficient. After all, if I am 
not to fix it, who will? Even if it is not completely fair that I bear the 




This seems especially unfair in the climate change context where the 
countries that “broke it” are generally much wealthier than the other 
countries that now have to incur great costs to deal with the possible 
consequences of the “broken” atmosphere.
243
 This last comment leads to a 
different type of objection to the use of tort claims, an objection that does 
not depend on whether liability or responsibility is the underlying norm, as 




H. The Distributive Implications of Accepting the Corrective Justice Claim 
 
The frequent use of the corrective justice claim in the climate change 
negotiations is based on a factual assumption that developed countries are 
responsible for a very large percentage of the historical emissions, whereas 
the costs likely to be imposed by those emissions are expected to be 
disproportionately visited on the poorer countries.
245
 This is also reflected 
in the UNFCCC as follows: “Noting that the largest share of historical and 
                                                                                                                 
 239. See Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 56 (quoting Henry Shue, 
Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT. AFFAIRS 531(1999)). 
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Weisbach presents an alternative view.
247
 He found that many poor 
countries are among the top current emitters of GHGs, especially if we take 
changes in land use into account, as we should.
248
 Using the data he could 
find on emissions, including land use change and the World Bank definition 
of high income of more than $11,906 GDP per capita, he found that high 
income countries in the top 20 emitters comprise thirty-six percent of 
cumulative emissions.
249
 Other countries make up forty-one percent of 




Weisbach found that once we account for land use change, there are 
many developing countries on the list of top emitters, with Brazil and 
Venezuela among the major emitters in terms of the percentage of their 
contributions to the global total.
251
  
It is clear that the United States and a few other developed countries 
are responsible for a large share of the GHG stock and are high per-capita 
emitters.
252
 It is also clear that many poor countries that will be severely 
harmed by climate change are far less responsible for the existing GHG 
stock, both in absolute terms, and due to their much lower emissions per-
capita.
253
 India is a case in point.
254
  
However, what has also become clear is that the conventional wisdom 
was based on the aggregation of many developing countries together, while 
ignoring emissions from land use change.
255
 Weisbach highlighted the 
surprising fact that it was not only rich countries that contributed to the 
stock of GHG in the atmosphere; many poor countries have very high 
emissions per-capita.
256
 This means that if we endorse the use of tort claims 
in the climate change context, and assuming that the required calculations 
could be made, many poor countries will be held liable/responsible.
257
 Tort 
                                                                                                                 
 246. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1. 
 247. See Weisbach, Negligence, supra note 193, at 32 (The Harvard Project on 
International Climate Agreements Discussion Paper, 2010) [hereinafter Weisbach] (arguing 
that many poor countries are top emitters, even on a per-capita basis). 
 248. See id. at 14–15 (“[P]oor countries have higher emissions from land use 
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 249. Id. at 16. 
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 256. Id. at 17–18. 
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claims would therefore have unwarranted distributive implications.
258
 
Under a welfarist analysis, this would be a strong claim against the use of 
corrective justice,
259
 but this is not very meaningful because, under a 
welfare analysis, we would not have considered corrective justice, which is 
a fairness-based notion, in the first place. However, the distributive effects 
also matter under an equality-based analysis.
260
 Remembering that the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
261
 in the UNFCCC 
was followed by the words “and respective capabilities”
262
 tells us that 
promoting corrective justice (the differentiated responsibilities) was not 







International climate change negotiations are complex, and a lot is at 
stake. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed it 
succinctly in his 2007 speech in Bali: “Today we are at a crossroads—one 
path leading towards a comprehensive new climate agreement and the other 
towards a betrayal of our planet and our children. The choice is clear.”
264
 
We are still at that crossroads and the choice is still clear. But the 
temptation to free ride is great, as mitigation costs are high, and near 
universal cooperation is required.
265
 There are no historical precedents for 




Developed countries are expected to show leadership, but the major 
developing countries will have to join them at the helm. As stated by 
climate change expert Nicholas Stern, “the future of the climate will largely 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See id. at 35 (“Notions of corrective justice typically make no exception for 
income levels or poverty. Tort law imposes liability on negligent injurers regardless of 
income: if you negligently hit me with your car, you are liable even if you are poor.”).  
 259. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1610–11 (noting the welfarist analysis in 
connection with corrective justice). 
 260. Id. 
 261. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1. 
 262. Id. 
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 264. Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary General, Address at the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference (Dec. 12, 2007). 
 265. See METZ, supra note 115, at 318 (2010) (explaining the necessity of everyone 
participating, considering that “no economic sector covers more than 25% of the total 
emissions”). 
 266. See Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense? Time to Rethink the 
Kyoto Protocol, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 7 (2002) (mentioning the creation of the WTO, the 
Marshall Plan, and NATO as the only possible exceptions,  but explaining that climate 
change is much more challenging).  
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be shaped by the developing countries: in population terms, it is their 
planet . . . . The large developing countries will be central to the design and 
execution of international action to protect their future . . . . [T]he numbers 
on population and future emissions are such that a credible response cannot 
come from the rich countries alone.”
267
  
If developing countries perceive the agreement to be unfair, this would 
affect not only their willingness to sign it, but also their motivation to 
implement and enforce it if they signed it due to political or other 
pressure.
268
 One of the major impediments to the success of the 
international negotiations is the suspicion held by developing countries that 
climate change discussions are a “tool that the North is using to slow the 
economic and political rise of the South.”
269
 At such high levels of 
suspicion, engaging in an open analysis of the moral claims by developing 
countries is critical to creating the trust necessary to reach an agreement. 
Finally, I find it important to stress that equity arguments should not 
be used to justify exempting any nations from taking part in the global 
abatement scheme. As mentioned earlier, global coverage is necessary to 
prevent leakage and supply side effects.
270
 Without coverage on a level 
sufficient to prevent leakage and supply side effects, it is doubtful that 
significant, possibly disastrous, climate change can be prevented.
271
 Equity-
based arguments should only justify transfer payments. The recipients will 
be free to use the money as they see fit, but unlike the case under the Kyoto 
Protocol, they will have to limit their GHG emissions (defined to include 
deforestation) according to a global abatement scheme.
272
 
I think that the global abatement scheme should be made explicit and 
binding on all countries, developing and developed alike. Setting goals and 
                                                                                                                 
 267. STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 13.   
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 269. See Ramgopal Agarwala, Towards a Global Compact for Managing Climate 
Change, in POST-KYOTO INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 75 (Aldy & Stavins eds., 2009) 
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targets for GHG emission reduction is not enough. Governments commit, 
but in practice ignore the goals, either because they are overly optimistic or 
because there is no sanction for failing to meet them.
273
 Targets are not very 
helpful in solving the free riding problem. 
In theory, cap-and-trade and carbon tax are equally efficient, but cap-
and-trade requires an initial decision regarding the allocation of emission 
permits to states.
274
 This is a highly loaded issue, as it raises very difficult 
moral questions regarding people’s rights in the atmosphere. It is much 
better to avoid those questions and negotiate the global abatement scheme 




“Developing countries are much more likely to agree to a global 
harmonized carbon tax, with each country retaining the tax revenue, than to 
any form of global cap-and-trade regime, short of one that involves an 
equal per capita allocation,”
276
 which is unacceptable to the United States. 
As I have written in another article, 
 
The reason is simple. Under a cap-and-trade regime, when a developing 
country such as China or India experiences economic growth that is 
relatively greater than that experienced by developed countries, it emits 
more GHG. Under a cap-and-trade regime, it is then required to 
purchase permits from developed countries such as the United States. 
Under a harmonized carbon tax regime, it pays more carbon taxes, but 
the tax revenue is retained by its own treasury. This makes a huge 




Once distributive and corrective justice claims are openly discussed, 
their normative weaknesses exposed, and their strengths acknowledged, 
they can be put aside to allow for a forward-looking agreement to be 
signed. On signing the agreement, countries will use transfer payments to 
roughly equalize their benefits from the global mitigation scheme. 
Developing countries will tend to be on the receiving side, due to their 
comparatively high opportunity costs.
278
 In addition, developing countries 
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will receive transfers on distributive (not corrective) justice grounds to 
finance adaptation. To assure compliance with the mitigation scheme, these 
transfers will be paid in installments, conditional on performance.  
                                                                                                                 
the money spent on GHG mitigation to fight poverty and to invest in technology, human 
capital, and infrastructure to improve their opportunities to experience economic growth. Id. 
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